regard to the original jurisdiction of these courts, the Supreme Court has done two things. First, it has expressed great concern with the scope of the congressional grants, specifically undertaking the task of construing the statutory language. Second, it has construed those grants far more narrowly than the Constitution or the language of the statutes would require. This caution and circumspection bespeak concerns regarding federalism and respect for the limited nature of federal jurisdiction.
The Court has treated supplemental jurisdiction in a wholly different fashion. For over a century, it recognized and greatly expanded the scope of supplemental jurisdiction without a single mention of statutory authorization. In stark contrast to its treatment of original jurisdiction, the Court has been anything but cautious or restrictive. It has boldly asserted supplemental jurisdiction to the full constitutional limit, asserting power over all claims that have a sufficient transactional relationship to be included in a single "case or controversy."
The judiciary's consistent failure to so much as mention statutory authorization, much less acknowledge the need for it, has led many to conclude that supplemental jurisdiction is a form of common law subject matter jurisdiction. 5 But in view of the requirements of Article III, that term is an oxymoron. Unless the judiciary has unconstitutionally usurped legislative power for a century, there must be some statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction.
In the mid-1970's, the Court finally addressed the issue of congressional authorization of supplemental jurisdiction. But neither Aldinger v. Howard 6 nor Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger 7 established a principled, comprehensive approach. Instead, the Court in each case looked for evidence of specific congressional intent to preclude the use of supplemental jurisdiction under the specific circumstances presented. This approach is fundamentally flawed. The search for congressional preclusion of jurisdiction assumes that Congress had previously granted authority over supplemental claims. Yet the Court never identified the source of that grant, and thus failed to establish a statutory basis for the principled resolution of supplemental jurisdiction questions. In short, the Court sanctioned an ad hoc search for legislative intent despite the rather obvious fact that Congress, in passing the general jurisdictional statutes, has never expressly considered supplemental jurisdiction. As a DUKE LAWTOURNAL result, the law of supplemental jurisdicfion is more confused today than it was before the Court spoke.
I propose a new, principled approach to the question of congressional authorization of supplemental jurisdiction, one that identifies the source of the statutory grant of supplemental jurisdiction and recognizes its policy underpinnings. Supplemental jurisdiction is rooted in those portions of the jurisdictional statutes granting power over a "civil action." That Congress, in effect, delegated to the judiciary the power to define that term is shown not only by the statutory language but also by its delegation to the Supreme Court of the power to prescribe the joinder rules that establish the scope of the litigative unit.
My approach requires study of the two distinct, and seemingly inconsistent, lines of cases mentioned above, as well as related portions of the jurisdictional statutes. The consistently narrow interpretations of original jurisdiction are based on those parts of the statutes relating to the basis ofjurisdiction, such as federal question or diversity of citizenship. In contrast, the supplemental jurisdiction cases are based on the statutory phrase giving jurisdiction over an entire civil action, notjust the jurisdiction-invoking claim. Each portion of the statute is supported by important policies; while the narrow construction of original jurisdiction respects federalism and avoids overwhelming federal court workloads, the broad construction of supplemental jurisdiction, when combined with the joinder rules, promotes efficient packaging of disputes and avoids duplicative litigation and the risk of inconsistent results.
The proper resolution of any supplemental jurisdiction problem, then, requires recognition of these separate statutory bases and policies. Each line of authority should be allowed to operate in its proper sphere. After the narrow restrictions on invocation of jurisdiction have been satisfied, the court will have ftfilled the policies underlying those restrictions. Then it should flesh out the scope of the entire civil action through the joinder rules and supplemental jurisdiction, effectuating the separate policies that support entertaining the entire civil action. It is here that the Supreme Court erred in Aldinger and Kroger. By failing to recognize that it was dealing with separate statutory authorizations and policies, the Court imported the restrictions on invocation of original jurisdiction into the supplemental jurisdiction realm, where such restrictions simply are not appropriate.
Part I of this article traces the development of the line of cases narrowing the statutory provisions for the invocation of federal jurisdiction, identifying the policies underlying that development both from a public- 
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interest and an interest-group perspective." Part II contains a similar analysis of the line of cases developing broad supplemental jurisdiction and discusses the tension between the two lines. 9 Part III reconciles the narrow and the broad jurisdictional readings, setting forth a statutory model for supplemental jurisdiction that debunks the myth of common law subject matter jurisdiction and sets forth a principled, consistent method for approaching supplemental jurisdiction problems. 1 0 Part IV contrasts that model's resolution of Aldinger and Kroger with the Court's actual treatment of these two cases. 11 Finally, Part V assesses the impact of Aldinger and Kroger, and concludes that they fail to establish any principles for dealing with congressional authorization of supplemental jurisdiction.
I. NARRow INTERPRETATIONS OF JURISDICTIONAL GRANTS
The Constitution sets the outer boundaries of federal jurisdiction, permitting Congress to empower the lower federal courts to entertain "cases or controversies" falling within those boundaries. 13 This jurisdiction is not self-executing; Congress must prescribe it.14 The Supreme Court has consistently given narrow readings to the statutory language used by Congress to establish jurisdictional bases. 15 The two most important bases of federal court jurisdiction-diversity of citizenship and general federal question-provide good examples.
A. Background and History.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the lower federal courts to hear diversity cases. 16 Although the relevant language mirrored that of the Constitution, 17 the Supreme Court in Strawbridge v. Curtiss1 8 interpreted the statute to require complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants. 19 The Court gave no reason for its restrictive reading; it pointed to no legislative history or indication of congressional intent, nor did it purport to rely on the slight linguistic differences between the statute and the Constitution.
Congress has revised the diversity statute eight times in the ensuing two centuries. 20 Yet it has never either expressly incorporated the complete diversity rule into the statute or expressly rejected it. Thus the complete diversity requirement survives, on the theory that Congress implicitly adopted it in the subsequent reenactments. 21 Despite the statute's almost verbatim use of the relevant constitutional language, 2 2 the Court has also interpreted the grant of general federal question jurisdiction narrowly. 23 It has used two devices to narrow federal question jurisdictional statutes: a limited interpretation of
17.
The Constitution provides for jurisdiction over controversies "between Citizens of diterent States." U.S. CoNsr. art. HI, § 2. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for diversity jurisdiction when a "suit [wasl between a citizen of the state where the suit [was] brought, and a citizen of another state" and the amount in controversy exceeded $500. Judiciary Act of 1789, oh. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The statute is today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982) , and provides for jurisdiction over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $I0,000... and is between.., citizens of diffierent States."
18. 7 U.S. 22. The Constitution provides for jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. Coiqsr. art. HI, § 2. The original general federal question statute provided for jurisdiction over "any suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity... arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority .... t Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-73 (pt. 3). The statute is today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) , and provides for jurisdiction over "all civil actions... aris [ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
23. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
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whether a claim "arises under" federal law, and the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. The first of these devices concerns the quantum of federal material that must be present to invoke federal question jurisdiction. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 24 the Court held that constitutional power existed whenever federal law was an ingredient in the cause of action. 25 A similar reading of the legislative grant of federal question jurisdiction would have opened the floodgates to a torrent of cases. 26 Although the Court in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases 27 interpreted the statute as coextensive with the constitutional grant, it quickly perceived the potential workload problem and "acted understandably in giving a restrictive reading to the statute.1 28 The resulting interpretation of the statutory "arising under" phrase is narrower than the interpretation given the constitutional grant in Osborn.
29
The second device the Court has used to narrow federal question jurisdiction is the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Louisville & Nashville DYKELA WJOUANAL [VoL 1987:34 Railroad Co. v. Mottley 30 contains the most famous statement of this rule: the basis for the federal court's jurisdiction must appear on the face of a proper complaint, and may not be based on federal issues raised by way of defense or counterclaim. 31 The rule can result in a federal court's having no jurisdiction in a case that centers on federal law. 3 2 The narrow interpretation of the federal question statute has often resulted in issues of federal substantive law being decided by state courts.
33
There are strong policy reasons for construing jurisdictional statutes more narrowly than the corresponding constitutional grants; most commentators note that the Constitution is by nature a general document, and that Congress has been left room to grant such specific portions of the whole as it deems necessary. 3 4 Although there is support for concluding that Congress intended to extend jurisdiction to the constitutional limit with both diversity and federal question jurisdiction, 3 5 the Court has consistently resisted this conclusion.
211 U.S. 149 (1908).
31. Id at 153-54. I use the term "proper compIaint" to reflect the Court's holding that jurisdiction cannot be based on the anticipation in a complaint of a federal issue that might be raised by a defense to that complaint. See id. at 152-54; see also J. FAENTRHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLII, supra note 1, § 2.4; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 5, § 2.6; C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 18.
32. This is true even with respect to a matter ostensibly entrusted exclusively to the federal courts. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 23-24. For example, assume an action in state court by a patentee to collect royalties owed by his licensee for use of a patented device. The licensee defends by asserting that the patent is void for want of originality. Absent diversity, the case cannot be removed. There is no federal question jurisdiction, since the federal issue is injected into the case by way of defense, and would not appear in a well-pleaded complaint as required by Mottley. Yet the major issue to be resolved in the case is the validity of the patent. Even though federal courts have by statute excusivejurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents," 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) 33. The rule's value as a relatively simple test applied to the initial pleading of the suit is generally thought to outweigh this "loss" of cases to state court. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 23 ("Given the limited nature of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is essential that the existence ofjurisdiction be determined at the outset rather than being contingent upon what may occur at later stages in the litigation."). Nonetheless, the rule has not been the subject of universal praise. Id. § 2.4, at 22-24; C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 18, at 98-102. Moreover, it is not a simple rule when declaratory relief is sought. See L., § 18, at 100.02.
34. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 870-73 (discussing the extent to which statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction by Congress in 1789 and 1875 did not confer the entire scope ofjurisdiction allowed by the Constitution, despite the use of language identical to that found in the Constitution). There are several strong policies supporting narrow statutory construction. See infra text accompanying notes 36-53.
35. This is especially so with regard to the federal question statute. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
B. Traditional Canons of Statutory Construction and the Emergence of a Consistent Policy.
Two traditional canons of statutory construction 36 have played a significant role in the narrow readings of grants of original jurisdiction. The Court has ignored one traditional canon, the plain meaning rule, and has adhered rigorously to another, the canon of implicit adoption. The result has been a consistent policy of narrow construction.
The plain meaning rule requires that the legislature be taken at its word when it uses langnage of clear meaning. 37 This canon prohibits reference to anything other than the terms of the statute, much as the parol evidence rule precludes use of extrinsic evidence to alter the meaning of a written contract. Like the parol evidence rule, the plain meaning rule was eroded when courts began to look to legislative history as evidence of the legislature's true intent.
The Supreme Court ignored this rule when it formulated its original narrow interpretations of the jurisdictional statutes. Under the plain meaning rule, the original diversity statute would have extended jurisdiction to the constitutional limit, since the statute tracked the relevant constitutional language. Only some policy, which Congress did not state and which Chief Justice Marshall declined to discuss in Strawbridge, could have justified the narrower construction.
There is even more evidence that Congress intended that the original general federal question statute embrace the entire quantum of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction. Not only did the statute's drafter track the relevant constitutional langnage, he also stated in floor debate that the intent was to vest the entire constitutional federal question jurisdiction. 38 dent, he thought that it would have been unconstitutional to do otherwise. 39 Despite this evidence, the Court wasted no time in imposing "statutory" limitations; it espoused the well-pleaded complaint rule, for example, just two years after the statute was enacted! 0 Although it has ignored the plain meaning canon, the Supreme Court has adhered scrupulously to the canon of implicit adoption, under which the reenactment of a statute without criticism of judicial interpretations is considered a legislative adoption of those interpretations. 4 1 The Court initially interpreted the language of both the diversity and general federal question statutes narrowly. In each case, Congress reenacted the* statute without changing it so as to "overrule" the narrowing precedent. The implicit adoption canon permits the federal courts to assume that Congress has adopted the Court's restrictive interpretations. 42 Thus today we speak of the complete diversity rule and the well-pleaded complaint rule as "statutory requirements."
But they are not statutory at all, of course, at least not in the sense that Congress expressed them. The Court imposed them, and Congress did nothing to change the Court's imposition. It is not immediately or intuitively obvious that reenactment without amendment justifies the conclusion that Congress intended to incorporate the restrictive interpretation. There is no gnarantee that members of Congress were aware of the judicial interpretations. Those who were may not have agreed with the interpretation and may have felt that the reenactment without comment constituted a rejection of the restriction. 43 There is simply no way to tell." These currents of public, policy still support the narrow interpretation of statutory grants of jurisdiction, which respects the states' domain by limiting federal court intrusion in matters that state courts can easily decide. It also avoids swamping the federal courts with a caseload both quantitatively overwhelming and qualitatively unimportant. Finally, the Court's consistency gives Congress a bright-line test: if the legislature disagrees with the Court's iterpretation of a statute, it must expressly "overrule" it in a reenactment. 5 3
All of these policies can be seen as in the public interest. Some are consistent, however, with private goals. For example, federal judges have a personal interest in the quantity and quality of their caseload.
This natural interest suggests another way to assess the jurisdictional grants.
C. The Resulting Symbiosis: Suggesting an Interest-Group Analysis of
Jurisdictional Legislation.
The interaction between the federal courts and Congress has led to an interesting symbiosis. Congress is fairly passive in this relationship. It has reenacted the diversity and general federal question statutes without much more than some fine-tuning, such as straightening out corporate citizenship or adjusting the amount-in-controversy requirement. 5 4 It
52.
See supra note 26. 53. Still, one wonders how Congress could ever succeed in vesting jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. If Congress intends to vest broad jurisdiction in the lower federal courts, the Court will apparently require it to do so by means of some sort of superlegislative action. Congress has already tried using the constitutional language and indicating in the legislative history that it intended to vest jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
It is unlikely that Congress could succeed in overriding the implicit adoption canon by "overruling!' the Court in successive legislation. Indeed, it would probably be more difficult to satisfy this superlegislative requirement than it is to override a presidential veto, even though the latter vote requires a supermajority. First, the presidential veto is a more direct rejection of the legislation than is a narrow judicial interpretation, which can be couched in reasonable terms regarding perceived linguistic ambiguities in the statute. Second, the veto will almost always be well publicized, making the legislation a topic of public discussion, possibly galvanizing Congress. Finally, the veto is iminediate, while the narrow judicial construction may take place years after the legislation passed, and thus may be presented to a body much different from the one that passed the statute, one that takes no offense at the judicial interpretation.
For a discussion of the relationship between the federal judiciary and Congress, see infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text. has done nothing to change the judicial restrictions on the invocation of jurisdiction, and thus has led the courts to assume that their restrictive interpretations have been accepted. This relationship, and the jurisdictional statutes that spawned it, may be analyzed through the economic or interest-group model of legislation. Although by no means new, 55 that model has received increasing attention in the scholarly literature recently, both as a general theory S6 and as an aid to understanding specific statutes. 5 7 Commentators, however, have not rigorously applied the model to jurisdictional legislation. Nor shall I. My purpose here is merely to suggest such an approach, as an alternative to the public-policy justifications discussed above.
The central theme of the interest-group model is that statutes are commodities sold by the legislature to the highest bidder. 58 Thus legislation is essentially a bargain between the legislature and some interest group benefited by the legislation. The legislature and the interest group must rely on other governmental branches, including the courts, to act as agents to enforce the bargain. 5 9 These agents are presumed to be "rational economic actors" who will enforce the statute in a way that fosters their own concerns as much as possible. 60 To the extent that views of the agent diverge from those of the principal, the principal's goal may not be fully realized. Economists call these thwarting factors "agency costs." (asserting that it is not illegal "for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors"). 61. My purpose here is to sketch the preliminary outline ofan interest-group theory ofjurisdictional legislation, upon which I intend to elaborate in a future article. As with any preliminary theoretical sketch, I run the risk of painting with too broad a brush. In general terms, I see the
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Jurisdictional statutes appear to fit this basic model nicely; they may be seen essentially as deals between the legislature and the organized bar.
This relationship was made clear in 1978, when Congress rejected the most recent proposal to abolish general diversity jurisdiction 62 -a proposal that was supported by the President, the Attorney General, the Chief Justice, 63 and many other leading members of the federal bench.6 4 Simply put, the opposition-the organized bar-won Congress's favor. The ABA Board of Governors, the American Trial Lawyers Association, and state bars or bar committees from all fifty states opposed the legislation. 65 This sentiment appeared to come from all parts of the profession. As one commentator reported, during the decade in which the proposal was before Congress in one form or another, "it is doubtful [whether] as many as two private practitioners... ever appeared in support of it. ''66 Seen in these terms, the traditional scholarly debate regarding the "deal" here as one between Congress and the organized bar. In reality, we might expect to find some divergence of opinion within the bar as a whole. For example, one might expect small, rural law firms to prefer abolition of diversity jurisdiction, which could increase their chances of doing battle before the local state court judge. Large, national law firms, on the other hand, might prefer expanded diversity jurisdiction; members of such firms may feel more comfortable litigating in federal court and may feel that state courts in smaller cities are biased. 65. Frank, supra note 61, at 404-05 & n.3. 66. Md at 404. Few statistics on attorney preferences are available. One fairly recent poll of practicing lawyers showed that 69% opposed abolishing diversity jurisdiction, 26% favored aboli-historical and contemporary justifications for diversity jurisdiction 67 pales. We do not keep diversity jurisdiction because of fear of local prejudice, or out of a desire to have federal judges retain facility with the common law, 68 or for any of the reasons normally addressed in the scholarly debate. We keep diversity jurisdiction because a politically influential group wants it-for whatever reason-and is powerful enough to get Congress to reject every effort to take it away. 6 9
We know little about why the bar wants diversity jurisdiction. Perhaps some members agree with the traditional reasons set forth in the scholarly debate favoring diversity. More likely, they are motivated by more pragmatic considerations. Diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum, an option that lawyers can offer to clients. 70 Possibly, the defense of diversity is nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction by a group that feels that a vested interest is being threatened. 7 1 This may not be a traditional (or even a good) reason to retain diversity jurisdiction, but it may make sense to the interest group in position to lobby successfully for its continuing existence.
If the jurisdictional legislation may be seen as a bargain between the legislature and the bar, the agent charged with enforcement of the bargain is the federal judiciary. Yet, as the interest-group model would predict, this agent, when enforcing the bargain, seeks to advance its own goals. 7 2 Every jurisdictional grant increases the workload of the federal judges; such legislation affects them directly and they have an incentive to reduce the flow of cases into their courts. The federal judiciary's general antipathy toward diversity jurisdiction 73 may be a response to this 68. These are among the several traditional justificatios for diversity jurisdiction. See fd. at 339-43; Frank, supra note 61, at 409. 69. C. WRIGmT, supra note 25, § 23, at 137 (noting that the future of diversity jurisdiction will probably not be resolved on the merits, since "[a]ny proposal to modify diversity meets immediate organized opposition from those who believe that they have a vested interest in preserving, for their own advantage, the widest possible choice of forum").
70. Frank, supra note 61, at 405 (abolition of diversity jurisdiction would "deprive the bar... of a resource which it values"). See also C. WmiGHT, supra note 25, § 23, at 135 (recognizing that litigants may use choice of forum for tactical purposes).
71. See supra note 69.
72.
See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. 73. As noted, sketching a general preliminary theory always presents the danger of overgeneralization. I do not mean to imply that all federal judges favor abolition ofdiversity jurisdiction. Certainly, however, a noteworthy number of leading federal judges have publicly taken that position. It may be that the reaction varies at trial and appellate levels. Appellate judges have written most of Vol. 1987:34] incentive. No doubt some judges would abolish diversity to gain personal leisure. 74 Others oppose diversity jurisdiction because they cannot render precedential decisions on matters of state law. 75 And others resent the way diversity cases impose on their consideration and resolution of what they perceive as more challenging and important federal substantive legal questions.
76
Of course, the bench has no incentive to strain relations with Congress. 77 Although Article I judges enjoy life tenure and immunity from salary cuts, 7 8 Congress can freeze judicial salaries and can cut funding for law clerks, secretaries, and office equipment from paper clips to word processors. 79 This congressional power imposes pragmatic limits on the federal judiciary's ability to maximize its own priorities.
Thus there are both strong public-policy and interest-group underpinnings supporting the narrow construction of statutory jurisdictional grants. From either standpoint, though, Congress has a recognized role in the development of policy. The courts, aware that they are interpreting statutes, address the statutory language and express concern with the critical literature. See supra note 64. Interestingly, however, many trial judges-those on whom the burden of diversity jurisdiction is greatest-have shown great sympathy to inclusive joinder in diversity cases, despite the Supreme Court's signal that they need not do so. 76. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 369-72. I do not suggest that the federal bench is interested in the three-day work week. To the contrary, one of the principal arguments by judges against diversity jurisdiction is that it takes time away from federal question cases, as to which the federal bench is the only definitive arbiter. Diversity cases, on the other hand, involve state substantive law, as to which only state courts can give authoritative interpretations. In view of some federal court hostility toward diversity jurisdiction, see supra note 62 and accompanying text, one might expect federal courts to impose more judicial restrictions in that type of case. Indeed, as suggested below, the Supreme Court's major supplemental jurisdiction cases of the 1970's may be seen as a statement of antidiversity bias unsupported by congressional sanction. See infra text accompanying notes 219-21.
77. Although Congress has accepted without criticism somejndicially imposed restrictions on the invocation of jurisdiction, see supra notes 13-35 and accompanying text, its consistent rejection of efforts to abolish diversity jurisdiction suggests that there are limits to the federal judiciary's leeway to impose restrictions on jurisdiction invocation. congressional intent. A sharp contrast to this approach is evident in the line of cases involving supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the courts broadly interpret the litigative unit with little or no mention of congressional intent. The hegemony of the courts is so striking that many observers have concluded that supplemental jurisdiction constitutes common law development of subject matter jurisdiction. 80
H. BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE LITIGATIVE UNIT
While it was limiting the reach of original jurisdictional grants, the Supreme Court was promoting something seemingly contradictory: the packaging of an entire dispute into a single piece of litigation, notwithstanding that some portions of the case were not supported by independent bases of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court instigated and supported this trend toward joining federal and nonfederal claims in two major ways: by recognizing and expanding supplemental jurisdiction, 8 1 and by promulgating the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
A. Supplemental Jurisdiction and the Joinder Rules: Confluence of Procedural and Constitutional Tests.
The Supreme Court recognized in 1824 that a federal court may decide matters of state law in a federal question case. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 8 3 Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[tihere is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."8 4 Because the federal court had jurisdiction over the entire case, it had power to determine incidental nonfederal substantive questions. 85 In the early twentieth century, the Court upheld the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a separate nonfederal claim that was part of the same cause of action as a pending federal claim. In 1861, the Court expressly recognized supplemental jurisdiction over nonfederal claims joined to a pending case. In Freeman v. Howe, 8 7 the federal court had custody of property that was the center of dispute. Unless the Supreme Court allowed potentially affected absentees, whose joinder would have destroyed complete diversity, to intervene in the federal action, they might have been denied a forum in which to press their claims to the property. Using this implicit necessity as its justification, the Court upheld jurisdiction over such "ancillary and dependent [claims] . . . without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 88 Commentators universally characterize Freeman as a case in which supplemental jurisdiction was necessary to avoid a violation of due process; 89 if the Court had not allowed the intervenors to litigate in the federal court that held the disputed property, they would have been denied a hearing. But this reasoning assumes that the efficient packaging ought to take place in federal, and not state, court. Due process obviously does not compel this result. Indeed, due process could have been satisfied in Freeman-and the Strawbridge rule left unsullied-by dismissing the entire case under the doctrine of indispensable parties 90 and allowing all parties to litigate in state court.
The Court overlooked that option, however, and chose instead to facilitate packaging in federal court, thereby implying that Strawbridge would be subordinated to the goal of inclusive packaging, at least as far as joined claims were concerned. In public-interest terms, this recognition of supplemental jurisdiction made the federal court a more efficient forum for dispute resolution. If the Court had insisted on separate grounds of jurisdiction for each joined claim, the litigants might have been forced to undertake duplicative litigation in state and federal court, There is also an interest-group explanation for this recognition of supplemental jurisdiction. If inclusive packaging were unavailable in federal court, many litigants would eschew that forum altogether and go to state court, where there are no such jurisdictional restrictions. Although the federal courts ought not be overburdened, undersubscription has costs as well. Failure to facilitate packaging through development of supplemental jurisdiction might have left the federal courts underused, hearing only cases involving relatively few parties, where joinder would not violate Strawbrdge. 92 Such highly specialized courts might not be a tool of real utility to the bar 93 and might not command great prestige. 9 4 In interest-group terms, then, the federal judiciary's desire to maximize prestige might lead to an expansion of supplemental jurisdiction. Thus the public interest in efficient litigation and interestgroup theory both support some liberality in facilitating joinder.
The Court apparently expanded the availability of supplemental jurisdiction in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange. 9 5 Moore permits federal courts to entertain a compulsory counterclaim, notwithstanding the absence of an independent jurisdictional basis. 96 Moore did not speak of a "necessity" for ancillary jurisdiction, but emphasized the close relationship between the plaintiff's claim and the counterclaim. 97 Although an attentive reading of Moore does not disclose a conscious desire to expand 91. Multiple litigation imposes duplicative costs on society, which must pay for the additional jurors and court personnel. The party involved not only incurs more expense, but may risk collateral estoppel from the case that goes to judgment first. See Matasar, supra note 1, at 170.
92. Of course, federal question cases would still be litigated in federal court. 93. See IL PoSNER, supra note 37, at 147-60. Perhaps this fear was greater at the time snpplemental jurisdiction was first recognized than it is today. It is interesting in this connection to compare the Supreme Court's concern in 1844 over the bar's dissatisfaction with the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge, see Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844), with the antidiversity sentiment expressed by some of today's leading federal judges, which prevails despite the bar's continued desire for diversity jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
94. See Landes & Posner, supra note 74, at 369 (discussing relationship between power to create precedents and prestige).
95. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). 96. Id at 610. The plaintiff's claim was based on federal antitrust laws, id at 602, while the couuterelaim was based on state law. Id at 603. Because the parties were not of diverse citizenship, there was no independent basis for jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Ido at 608.
97. Indeed, the relationship between the two claims was so close that the failure of one would establish the other. Ido at 609-10. The two claims thus fit within the "logical dependence" test later used by the Supreme Court in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978) in discussing the proper circumstances for exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text. Presumably, the Court could have based its decision on necessity, since failure to assert a compulsory comiterclaim resnlts in loss of the claim by "rule preclusion," which precludes a party from asserting a claim that could have been asserted, but was not, in a compulsory joinder device. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 79, at 527. the availability of supplemental jurisdiction, 98 commentators and the lower courts have consistently read the case as opening the door for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction justified by efficiency or convenience. 99 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938,100 provided an enormous boost for packaging litigation. The new joinder rules promoted an inclusive litigative unit based on transactional relationship; most of the rules permitted joinder of claims that arose from the "same transaction or occurrence" as the underlying action. 10 1
By increasing the possibility that nonfederal claims would be joined in federal court, these rules heightened the tension between the restrictions on federal jurisdiction and the goal of packaging. 10 2 The lower federal courts soon recognized, as the Supreme Court implicitly had in Freeman, that the efficacy of the joinder rules would be threatened were an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction required for each claim joined.
10 3 Inspired by Moore, the lower courts reevaluated and ultimately expanded the scope of supplemental jurisdiction to facilitate use of the Federal Rules. 1 04
The result was a general. confluence of the tests used for joinder and 101. The following rules employed the transaction or occurrence test, or one clearly encompassed by it, in prescribing appropriate joinder. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims), FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (cross-claims), FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a) (impleader claims; claims by third-party defendant against plaintiff, claims by plaintiff against third-party defendant), FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c) (third-party claims in admiralty), FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permissive partyjoinder), FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2) (intervention of right).
102 The case set the constitutional boundary for supplemental jurisdiction, holding that nonfederal claims could be heard if they were part of the same "case" as the jurisdiction-invoking claim. That issue was determined, inter alia," 1 0 by whether the nonfederal claims and a substantial federal claim properly before the court arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact." 11 1 The Court thus defined the constitutional term "case" in transactional terms; it expressly tied the propriety of supplemental jurisdiction to the factual commonality between nonfederal and federal claims, just as 110. In addition to the requirement that the federal and nonfederal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact," Gibbs requires that the federal issue be substantial and that the case be such that one would normally expect to try the federal and nonfederal claims in a single proceeding. If these conditious are met, then the federal court has power to entertain the entire action, although certain discretionary factors may justify dismissal of the nonfederal claim. IdL at 726-27. Some commentators have noted that the language used by the Court suggests that the expectation of a unified trial and the common nucleus requirement are disjunctive, not conjunctive. the lower courts had done in developing the confluence between the procedural and constitutional standards for joinder. 1 2 Gibbs did not mandate that supplemental jurisdiction be exercised. The Court made a sharp distinction between constitutionalpower to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and the circumstances under which that power ought to be exercised. 1 3 Under Gibbs, the trial judge has broad discretion to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and should consider "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants,"11 4 among other factors, 115 in determining whether to hear a nonfederal claim. Initially, commentators believed that the discretion recognized in Gibbs was so broad that the case would result in less use of supplemental jurisdiction. 116 In fact, of course, Gibbs has had the opposite effect. 11 7
The Gibbs Court failed to mention at all whether Congress had sanctioned the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, either in that case or generally. Indeed, in the century since Freeman, the Court had never addressed any statutory basis for its tremendous extension of supplemental jurisdiction. 11 Gibbs was the latest in this expansion, and it, like the others, purported to address only constitutional power to entertain nonfederal claims. 
C. Tension with the Narrow Interpretation of Jurisdictional Grants: The Oxymoron of Common Law Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Compared with the cases discussed in Part I, Gibbs and its predecessors present a manifest paradox. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has construed the invocation of jurisdiction so narrowly that cases clearly within the federal courts' constitutional competence must be heard in state court.' 19 On the other hand, cases from Freeman to Gibbs demonstrate great eagerness to bring into federal court claims that do not meet the statutory requirements for invoking jurisdiction.
This contrast is all the more curious when we consider the perceived role of Congress. On the one hand, where Congress has provided a statutory basis mirroring the Constitution, the courts have not exercised power to the constitutional limit. On the other hand, the courts have extended supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional limit without even mentioning a statutory basis.
Commentators have concluded that the supplemental jurisdiction developed in the cases culminating in Gibbs represented common law federal subject matter jurisdiction. 120 If one accepts the traditionally held view, the Constitution requires that Congress prescribe the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 121 Thus common law subject matter jurisdiction is an oxymoron, and unless we conclude that the courts have been usurping jurisdictional power unconstitutionally for over a century, 122 there must be a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction. Yet, as will be seen, Congress has never expressly addressed supplemental jurisdiction under the general jurisdictional statutes. 121. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 122. Of course, the charge that a branch of government has been acting unconstitutionally is not to be made lightly. Nonetheless, such longstanding unconstitutional action can occur. For example, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court concluded that its almost centurylong adherence to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), had been an unconstitutional usurpation of state power. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
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Chief Justice Marshall expressly limited the statutory phrase prescribing suit between a "citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State"; 123 similarly, the Court's limiting interpretations of the quantum of federal material that must be involved to invoke federal question jurisdiction have been constructions of the statutory requirement that an action "arise[ ] under" federal law. 124 The supplemental jurisdiction cases, in contrast, interpret a different part of the jurisdictional statutes-the part pertaining to the scope of the "civil action" properly before the court. Acceptance of this distinction not only renders manifest the Supreme Court's confusion in later supplemental jurisdiction cases, but also debunks the myth that supplemental jurisdiction constitutes common law subject matter jurisdiction.
A. The Scope of the Civil Action. Rejecting the Oxymoron of Common Law Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court's consistent failure even to refer to statutory authorization for supplemental jurisdiction does not mean that such authorization is nonexistent. 25 The entire tortuous exercise of narrowly construing the statutory language relating to jurisdictional basis was premised on an understanding of the difference between constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction. It is simply unthinkable that the Court would countenance an expansion of jurisdiction by judicial fiat.
A more persuasive explanation for the omission is that no separate statutory standard for supplemental jurisdiction exists; instead, that standard is the same as the constitutional standard. 26 In Gibbs, the Court held that the relationship between a state and a federal claim might be so close as to "permit[] the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'ease.' "27 So, too, the relationship between the state and federal claim might be so close as to permit the conclusion that they comprise one statutory "civil action." 128 In- It does seem clear that Congress delegated to the judiciary the task of defining "civil action"; it has never attempted itself to define the term, and could have expected that courts would be suited for the task. Congress has expressly delegated to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate the Federal Rules, 13 0 which include, of course, the joinder rules by which the litigative unit is defined. These rules have always favored a liberal definition of that unit, 13 1 and Congress has never exercised its statutory right to reject a joinder rule.
132
Both the courts and Congress seem to have recognized Congress's acquiescence in the federal judiciary's power to define the statutory scope of "civil action" under the jurisdictional statutes. In amending the diversity and general federal question statutes in 1940 to adopt the term "civil action," Congress expressly intended to have the statutory language comport with that used by the Supreme Court in the Federal Rules. 133 In 1969, the Court recognized that a Federal Rule could not, consistent with Rule 82,134 purport to define one of the statutory terms relating to invocation of diversity jurisdiction. 135 The Court said nothing, however, As Professor Currie has demonstrated, "[a]Ithough Gibbs did not similarly elaborate the statutory basis of pendent jurisdiction, the sole conceivable rationale is the same [as for constitutional propriety]." That is, the term "civil action" as used in the federal question statute "embraces state law claims sufficiently related to the federal" Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 753, 754 (1978) . Cf Shapiro, supra note 115, at 560 (supplemental jurisdiction "is, at most, implicit in a legislative grant of jurisdiction").
From 1875 until 1980, the general federal question statute gave district courts jurisdiction over "suits of a civil nature" or "civil actions" in which "the matter in dispute exceeds [ D ULE LA W JOURNAL that would limit the judiciary's power to define the scope of the litigative unit. Thus, both the structure of the jurisdictional statutes (providing for power over a "civil action" in a phrase separate from the language relating to the jurisdictional basis) and the grant of rulemaking power support the conclusion that Congress delegated to the federal courts authority to define the scope of the civil action. Both the transactional test of the Federal Rules and the Court's failure to mention a separate statutory standard in Gibbs suggest that the scope of the civil action is coextensive with the scope of the constitutional "case. ' 136 One can reasonably conclude that Congress has embraced the Court's equation of the statutory and constitutional standards for the scope of an action. Congress reenacted the diversity statute1 37 (and enacted for the first time the general federal question statutel 3 s ) after Freeman without any comment on that case's recognition of supplemental jurisdiction. It reenacted and extended the coverage of both statutes after Moore without any comment on that case. 1 39 It again reenacted without comment both statutes after the lower courts' expansion of supplemental jurisdiction to match the Federal Rules, 14 0 and it amended the federal question statute after Gibbs without voicing any displeasure with that case's liberal statement of supplemental jurisdiction. 14 1 Using the traditional canon of statutory construction invoked in the cases restricting original federal court jurisdiction, 142 Congress's failnre to disapprove of the judiciary's century-long expansion reflects its approval of a broad statutory view of the proper litigative unit.143
B. The Resulting Theory.
This recognition of a statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction is important for purposes of reconciling the two lines of cases; each line relates to a separate statutory provision embodying different policies. Keeping these separate bases and policies in mind helps to abate the ten- sion between the lines. All too often, however, courts misconstrue the task before them because of a failure to recognize the dual sets of interests involved.
Courts must address the restrictive line of authority first, to determine whether the claims originally stated, and the parties originally joined, satisfy one of the narrow bases for invoking jurisdiction. If they do, jurisdiction attaches, because the court has before it, for example, a "matter in controversy... between... citizens of different states." 144 Then, as a separate, second endeavor, the court may flesh out the proper scope of the entire civil action surrounding the jurisdiction-invoking claim. The Federal Rules and the Gibbs test define that scope in terms of constitutional (and, impliedly, statutory) power and the proper exercise of discretion. 145 This approach respects the policies underlying the respective lines of authority and assumes that a federal court acts within its power in defining the scope of the action before it. Thus, each line of authority operates where it is supposed to: the narrow line restricts invocation of jurisdiction, and the broad line promotes packaging.
This approach ensures that the policies underlying one line do not harm those supporting the other. For example, a court will not address supplemental jurisdiction until the restrictive rules for invoking jurisdiction are satisfied. Thus the desire for efficient packaging will not threaten the restrictions on invocation ofjurisdiction. Similarly, the cases relating to invocation of jurisdiction have no bearing on supplemental jurisdiction; applying them there would thwart the policies supporting that doctrine. Thus the separate parts of the statutes, and their case law, should be kept separate. 146 Interestingly, although the federal courts failed to discuss any statutory basis for supplemental jurisdiction, their treatment of supplemental jurisdiction until recently was remarkably consistent with the model I have set forth. Until the mid-1970's, supplemental jurisdiction had developed neatly. With striking uniformity, the federal courts exercised ju- plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party defendant. 15 1 The split of authority mirrored confusion about how to approach these cases. The Supreme Court addressed both situations in the 1970's and only compounded the confusion. Because the Court had never recognized a statutory grant of power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction apart from the language relating to jurisdictional basis, it failed to appreciate the different purposes and policies of the two lines of authority. Like a ship without a rudder, the Court sailed aimlessly, and proceeded on the absurd conviction that the judiciary could, notwithstanding the absence of legislative consideration of the issue, divine a legislative intent to preclude supplemental jurisdiction.
IV. THE 1970's AND THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
In the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court addressed two cases involving the questions of supplemental jurisdiction that had divided the lower courts. In deciding them, the Court failed to identify a statutory basis for the principled resolution of supplemental jurisdiction questions, sanctioning instead an ad hoe search for legislative intent that has merely led to confusion. As I will now show, adopting the principled approach I propose would resolve the problems and eliminate the confusion.
A. Pendent Parties.
Defining the Task" The PrincipledApproach
The typical pendent party case involves the assertion of a federal question claim against one defendant joined with a closely related state claim against a different, nondiverse, defendant. 152 As to this second defendant, there is neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the close factual relationship between the two claims might satisfy Gibbs. 152. See L FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. Mmmt , supra note 1, § 2.13, at 73 (arguably the most justifiable application of pendent party jurisdiction is in precisely such situations); see also Fortune, supra note 150, at 21 (courts should not hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over a state claim against one defendant that shares a common factual background with a substantial federal claim against a codefendant).
153. The Gibbs test embodies the implied statutory standard as well as the constitutional limit for supplemental jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 137-43.
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case represents a crossroads between the two lines of authority discussed above. To them, the liberality of the supplemental jurisdiction line of authority threatens at this point to overwhelm the narrow restrictions on invoking original jurisdiction.
The seriousness of the problem depends on the perspective one takes when attacking the pendent party problem. One who sees the case as presenting a supplemental jurisdiction issue would first consider whether the court's jurisdiction has been invoked by satisfaction of the restrictive line of authority. Presumably, the federal question as to the first defendant suffices for original jurisdiction, and the remaining question is whether the joined matter concerning the second defendant satisfies the procedural rules and Gibbs.
On the other hand, one who sees the case as presenting a problem of original joinder is troubled by the fact that pendent party jurisdiction allows the claim against the second defendant into federal court even though one of the restrictive lines of authority for invoking jurisdiction is not satisfied. Here, it may be more difficult to conclude that the original joinder against the pendent defendant is merely part of the process of fleshing out the scope of the civil action; it can as easily be seen as part of the process of invoking the court's original jurisdiction.
The unease surrounding pendent parties stems from a failure to appreciate the difference between these two perspectives and to assess critically which one is implicated in the case. The pendent party resultexercising jurisdiction over one against whom no federal claim is asserted-creates a serious problem only if one concludes that there is a statutory requirement that an independent basis of original jurisdiction exist over the claims asserted against each defendant.
Whether an independent basis of jurisdiction over each defendant is required depends on the statute involved and its requirements for invoking original jurisdiction. The restrictive interpretations of the diversity statute do require satisfaction of the original basis of jurisdiction as to all original defendants. Strawbridge demands that all original plaintiffs be of diverse citizenship from all original defendants; it thus prohibits a plaintiff from suing a diverse defendant and claiming pendent party jurisdiction over a nondiverse codefendant. 154 The general federal question statute, in contrast, does not require an independent basis of jurisdiction over each original defendant. 15 5 This difference stems, of course, from the character of the jurisdictional basis involved: federal question jurisdiction centers on substance, while diversity jurisdiction centers on parties.
Accordingly, in a diversity case involving a pendent party problem, the court would not reach a supplemental jurisdiction inquiry, since the requirements for invoking jurisdiction would not be satisfied. But where original jurisdiction is based on the general federal question statute, the pendent party case will present a supplemental jurisdiction problem, and the resolution of that problem will depend on whether joinder satisfies the joinder rules and the Gibbs constitutional (and implied statutory) standards for supplemental jurisdiction. Because Congress has not addressed the pendent party issue under the general federal question statute, congressional approval of supplemental jurisdiction should be presumed.
In Aldinger v. Howard, 15 6 the Supreme Court faced the pendent party issue under a specific federal question statute. Unfortunately, although Congress had not definitively addressed the question of supplemental jurisdiction in the context of that statute, the Court concluded that the legislature intended to preclude supplemental jurisdiction. 
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sued in federal court.' 59 The Court expressly limited the holding in Aldinger to the pendent party situation in a section 1983 case. 16° Nonetheless, the case is important because it expressly recognizes that Congress must authorize supplemental jurisdiction and implicitly rebuts the notion of common law subject matter jurisdiction. 16 The Court's treatment of congressional authorization is odd, however. The case implicitly establishes a presumption that supplemental jurisdiction will be available unless Congress has negated it in some way.' 62 Although the Court's approach seems consistent with my proposal, there is one glaring difference. The Court seems willing to presume congressional approval of supplemental jurisdiction, but it has never identified the source of that legislative grant. This oversight leads the Court to overlook the fact that supplemental jurisdiction is part of the statutorily sanctioned process by which the scope of the civil action is fleshed out. This will lead, in turn, to a failure to protect the policies underlying supplemental jurisdiction. Before addressing these points, it is worth noting how ephemeral the Court's presumption is.
b. Rebutting the presumption: seeking what does not exist. The
Court eviscerated its presumption by allowing rebuttal in the absence of any meaningful indication of congressional disapproval of supplemental jurisdiction. Section 1983 said nothing about supplemental jurisdiction; the legislative history was at best inconclusive. 163 In such a case, it is absurd to ponder a congressional intent to preclude supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed, the conclusion is especially ludicrous in 41dinger because pendent party jurisdiction had not even been recognized when 159. In the majority's view, the legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to preclude subjecting municipal bodies to suit in federal court on any jurisdictional basis. Aldnger, 427 U.S. at 16-17. This intent constituted implied rejection of supplemental jurisdiction. . at 19.
160. Id at 18. 161. r. at 15-16. The statutory issue bore discussion in .4ldinger because there was a debate over whether supplemental jurisdiction was allowed under the statute in question. The Court distinguished the Gibbs situation, where the Court could appropriately fashion its own rules of supplemental jurisdiction over nonfederal claims or questions in the face of congressional silence on those issues, from the Aldinger situation, where Congress had addressed the propriety of jurisdiction over certain parties, thus leaving the Court less discretion. rd. at 15-16. 162. Id. at 18. See Schenkier, supra note 86, at 257-60; see generally Comment, supra note 118, at 14042 (1977) (approving the Aldinger rule that jurisdictional statutes should be construed as granting pendent jurisdiction unless they negate it, but recognizing uncertainty as to what constitutes congressional negation).
163. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 704-804 (1871) (federal court may enforce state claims against local governments "under the ordinary restrictions as to jurisdiction"). 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 65
Congress enacted section 1983.164 How, then, could Congress have intended to preclude its use? By authorizing a search for legislative intent on an issue Congress never considered, the Aldinger Court invited all feder ! courts to speculate, to hunt for some fictive intent relating to supplemental jurisdiction. 165 Ironically, this practice leaves the ultimate decision not to the legislature-where it concededly belongs-but to the courts. This is exactly the result the Court ostensibly wanted to avoid. Indeed, Aldinger should be an especially good lesson about avoiding judicial inquiry into the nonexistent. Just two years after deciding the case, the Court overruled its earlier interpretation of legislative intent and held municipalities amenable to suit under section 1983.166
There is a more basic flaw in the Court's treatment of this fictive legislative intent to preclude supplemental jurisdiction. The Court erred in looking for congressional intent in the absence of congressional action. As Professor Mayton and others have shown, the Constitution embodies a bias against new legislation. 167 The framers purposefully made the pas- 166. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), the Court looked again at the legislative history of section 1983 and concluded that its previous reading of that history had been erroneous. C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 22A, at 121. Monell held that a municipal body is a "person" under section 1983, at least insofar as the gravamen of the claim against it is that the body's implementation of an official policy or custom worked a deprivation of civil rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Aldinger, had based his conclusion that counties were "persons" on a reading of some of the same portions of legislative history that were later relied on in MonelL Compare Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 26-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting portions of floor debates on predecessor of section 1983) with Monell, 436 U.. at 680 (relying on the same debates). But in Aldinger, the Court saw the legislative history relied on by Justice Brennan as irrelevant to the question of pendent party jurisdiction. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17 n.12. Thus Aldinger provided no clue that such a major shift in the reading of that history might be forthcoming. These divergent interpretations, within two years of each other, of the legislative history of a statute more than a century old, suggest the folly of the Court's reliance in Aldinger on the clear legislative intent of the statute. (Tllhe Constitution provides one way, and one way only-and that is a way hedged with careful safeguards-for Congress to express the national purpose and will.").
sage of new laws difficult by requiring majority votes in each House 168 and by providing for presidential veto. 169 The Court's conclusion that Congress can rule without satisfying those constitutionally imposed requirements-by merely "intending" some result-presumes Congress has more power than it does.
c. Confusing the narrow and the broad. The Court asserted that pendent party jurisdiction is, as a general matter, more difficult to sustain than other forms of supplemental jurisdiction because it involves proceeding against a defendant as to whom no federal claim is asserted 17 0 There is no basis for this general conclusion, which reflects fundamental confusion of the respective inquiries to be made. It presupposes that the jurisdictional statutes require an independent basis of jurisdiction as to each original defendant. As discussed above, however, only the diversity statute so requires. The Court added further confusion by positing a hypothetical example of an appropriate case for pendent party jurisdiction. The Court indicated that it would favor such jurisdiction when the jurisdiction-invoking claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. In such a case, the Court implied, it could presume that Congress intended broad packaging, since otherwise the plaintiff would have to split the case into two actions. But this example is meaningless. First, the Court contradicts itself. Earlier, it indicated that the relevant statutory inquiry was whether Congress had precluded jurisdiction.
17 3 With the example concerning exclusive jurisdiction, however, it approves supplemental jurisdiction because Congress has affirmatively embraced it. Second, the Court makes the fundamentally erroneous assumption that congressional intent (even if discernible and relevant) regarding one statute says anything at all about how a different statute should be interpreted. Indeed, the mere fact that Congress has statutorily granted exclusive original jurisdiction regarding a certain type of case may say nothing about its intent as to supplemeutal jurisdiction under that statute; it certainly says nothing about congres-168. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7. This requirement both "assures that the legislative power [will] be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings," Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951, and decreases the likelihood that it will be exercised at all. M. IusH & J. PROTHRO After all, the desire to package efficiently is the same regardless of whether the jurisdiction-invoking claim is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. And there may be a strong policy interest in having even a nonexclusive federal question heard in federal court. In Aldinger, for example, the plaintiff was forced to proceed against the county in state court.
174 Thus, she either had to (1) split her action between state court and federal court, (2) assert all claims in state court, thereby abandoning a federal forum for her federal claim, or (3) proceed in federal court and abandon the claim against the county altogether. Obviously, she would have preferred to assert federal rights in a federal forum, especially if she feared bias in the state courts. And although the legislative history of section 1983 was debated on some counts, 1 75 one thing is clear: Congress wanted these claims heard in federal court if the plaintiff so desired. 176 Thus, by limiting the packaging presumption to cases involving exclusive federal jurisdiction, the Court forced the abandonment of important federal claims to state courts.
In sum, Aldinger gives no consistent analysis. It purports to presume congressional approval for supplemental jurisdiction but fails to indicate the source of such grant. Its nervousness over not having an independent federal claim as to each defendant demonstrates a tendency to confuse restrictions on original jurisdiction with restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction. Unable to extract itself from this confusion, the Court attempted to resolve matters by a search for fictive intent. 177. F.D. R. Civ. P. 14(a) ("The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claims against the third-party plaintiff ... ").
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the defendant for indemnity or contribution relating to the plaintiff's underlying claim. 7 8 Second, the plaintiff's claim against the third party must "aris[e] from the same transaction or occurrence" as the underlying action. 7 9 This claim joinder requirement obviously satisfies the Gibbs test for supplemental jurisdiction. 1 8 0 Using the principled approach proposed above, the first inquiry is whether the restrictive statutory interpretation for invocation of original jurisdiction is satisfied. It will be, of course, if there is complete diversity between the original plaintiff and the original defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. The second step is to flesh out the scope of the civil action through the joinder rules and supplemental jurisdiction in accordance with Gibbs. The plaintiff's claim here is clearly a matter of subsequent joinder, not original invocation of jurisdiction. It thus does not implicate Strawbridge, and should be asserted under supplemental jurisdiction, since it satisfies both the Federal Rules and Gibbs. And because Congress has never satisfactorily addressed the general availability of supplemental jurisdiction either under the diversity statute or with regard to a Rule 14(a) claim by a plaintiff against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant, there is no basis for inquiring whether Congress has precluded the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.' 8 '
Nonetheless, the Court concluded in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger that Congress had intended to preclude supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 14(a) claims by a plaintiff against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant. 182 It did so only through a blatant mischaracterization of the issue, which allowed it to import into the supplemental jurisdiction inquiry restrictions that are appropriate only with regard to the invocation of original jurisdiction. In the Court's view, the plaintiff was attempting to assert state claims against both diverse and nondiverse parties. If this had been attempted in an original complaint, the joinder would have violated Strawbridge Therefore, a per se rule of dismissal was dictated; the plaintiff was attempting by indirection what could not be accomplished directly. 18 6 This reasoning presents profound confusion regarding the difference between invoking original jurisdiction and using supplemental jurisdiction to facilitate packaging.
b. Congressional intent: construing the nonexistent The Court's treatment of legislative intent in Kroger focuses on a series of irrelevant factors, such as defendant-initiation and logical dependence, which are to be weighed in some undefined ad hoc manner in order to ascertain whether Congress implicitly intended to preclude a particular exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
7
183. Id. at 371-72 & n.10. The plaintiff in Kroger was a citizen of Iowa; the defendant was a citizen of Nebraska, and the claim, for wrongful death of the plaintiff's husband, exceeded S10,000, so the case fell within diversity jurisdiction. The defendant impleaded a third-party defendant, against whom plaintiff asserted a claim under Rule 14(a). At the time she asserted the claim, it appeared that she and the third-party defendant were of diverse citizenship; thus there apparently was no supplemental jurisdiction issue. The court and the parties discovered after trial had commenced, however, that the plaintiff and the third-party defendant were in fact cocitzens, meaning, of course, that there was no independent basis of jurisdiction over the claim. See infra note 201. 184 Some commentators have suggested other similar factors, arranging them in some "proper" hierarchy to divine congressional intent. 188 Their serious discussion of the Court's multifactored guessing game lends unfortunate credence to an unprincipled approach. Arranging judicially created factors in a judicially perceived hierarchy is not going to help determine congressional intent regarding an issue that Congress never addressed. There can be no "congressional intent" in this situation, and the matter ought to be resolved by the presumption in favor of supplemental jurisdiction.
The Court relied principally on two factors in trying to justify its "statutory construction" in Kroger. First, the claim was not "logically dependent" upon resolution of the underlying action. 189 Second, supplemental jurisdiction was being sought by a plaintiff, not by a defensive party. 19 0 "True" supplemental jurisdiction claims, then, according to the Court, are logically dependent and are asserted by parties in a defensive posture. This conclusion represents nothing more than an ephemeral attempt to justify the result of the case.
First, the touchstone of supplemental jurisdiction has always been factual relatedness, not logical dependence. 191 The Kroger Court discussed the impleader claim as the archetype for ancillary jurisdiction because of its logical dependence. 192 Indeed, impleader claims are logically dependent: if the plaintiff loses the underlying action, the impleader claim falls; if the plaintiff wins, the court must address the impleader claim to see whether the loss will be shifted from the defendant to the third-party defendant.
But strict insistence upon logical dependence would significantly narrow supplemental jurisdiction. It would destroy the convenient confluence between the procedural and constitutional tests for joinder and would result in much wasteful collateral litigation. For example, with regard to counterclaims, Kroger would require the court first to assess the counterclaim's factual relatedness to the underlying action for purposes of classifying it as compulsory or permissive, 93 then to determine whether the logical dependence test is satisfied so that ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised if necessary. Use of the logical dependence standard would also preclude jurisdiction over several familiar claims for which the propriety of ancillary jurisdiction has never been questioned. The Court obviously realized this; after discussing the impleader claim as the archetype, it recognized without criticism the universal acceptance of supplemental jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, and claims by and against intervenors of right, 194 none of which are necessarily logically dependent on the underlying claims. 195 The Court made no effort to reconcile this recognition with its fetish for logical dependence as to the Rule 14(a) claim before it.
196
Similarly, the fact that the claim in Kroger was not asserted by one in a defensive posture is of little importance. The Court implies that the purpose of supplemental jurisdiction is to promote fairness to the defendant; a defendant precluded from asserting his related claims in the pending litigation would be forced to litigate twice, defending in federal court and pursuing his own claim in state court. The same inconvenience of course can befall the plaintiff too, but this carries less weight with the Court, since the plaintiff could have packaged the case efficiently by filing in state court in the first place.
197
This point overlooks the fact that Congress has expressly prescribed a federal forum and the fact that the Federal Rules permit the efficient packaging desired. 1 9 8 Moreover, nothing in the diversity statute or in Strawbridge requires that all assertions by a plaintiff, whenever joined, be supported by an independent basis of jurisdiction. Kroger's implicit assertion to the contrary extends Strawbridge improperly.
c. The unjustified expansion of Strawbridge through mischaracterization of the judicial task. The issue in Kroger was supplemental jurisdiction over a claim joined in accordance with the Federal Rules after the complaint had been filed and after independent action had been taken by another party. The real question before the Court, then, was the scope of 194 198. See Matasar, supra note 1, at 170 ("Mhe Court's presumption against jurisdiction in concurrent jurisdiction cases ignores long expressed congressional desire to preserve a true choice between state and federal courts.").
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the "civil action." Rather than adhere to the broad definitions set out in the Federal Rules and approved in Gibbs, the Court relied on the narrow interpretations appropriate to the original invocation of federal jurisdiction. Thus, the Court imported the Strawbridge restrictions on the invocation of jurisdiction into the supplemental jurisdiction sphere.
To the extent that Strawbridge is a case of importance to supplemental jurisdiction issues, 199 it held that a plaintiff cannot join a claim against a nondiverse adverse party as an original matter. 2 0° Mrs. Kroger did not do that. Instead, she used an available joinder rule to assert a claim against a third party whom the defendant had impleaded after commencement of the action. 20 1 Jurisdiction had attached by that point; the civil action was being fleshed out in accordance with the joinder rules and Gibbs.
Strawbridge has never been applied to preclude supplemental jurisdiction over any claim the plaintiff subsequently asserted against a party over whom jurisdiction was established. 202 Indeed, after Kroger, a plaintiff remains free to assert several such claims under supplemental jurisdiction. 20 3 Obviously, reading Strawbridge as Kroger apparently did-to apply to every assertion by the plaintiff-is completely inconsistent with the Court's longstanding policy, 2°4 restated forcefully in 1967,205 of con-struing Strawbridge narrowly.
The Court erred by treating a joinder issue as a matter of jurisdiction invocation. Its confusion appears to have been caused by its obsessive belief that the plaintiff could have foreseen the joinder of the nondiverse third-party defendant yet opted not to sue it originally, thinking that she would have a later opportunity to assert her claim through Rule 14(a), 20 6 The foreseeability ofjoinder, however, is absolutely irrelevant to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
d. The irrelevance offoreseeability. The Court rested its holding on its perception of congressional intent, setting forth the irrelevant factors discussed above. 20 7 Its concern with the foreseeability of joinder simply does not reflect congressional intent as to supplemental jurisdiction. Congress has determined that the federal courts' jurisdiction ought to be divested only when a party "has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." 20° Because that statute is not implicated here, it should follow that Congress would not be concerned with the foreseeability of joinder.
Moreover, there is no such preemption of supplemental jurisdiction in other joinder situations where joinder of an absentee is at least as foreseeable. 20 9 The plaintiff may choose, for example, to sue only one of two potential defendants, "knowing" that self interest will force the nondiverse absentee to intervene 2 10 and that intervention of right will carry with it ancillary jurisdiction. 211 In such a case, the plaintiff is achieving indirectly what he could not achieve directly, yet there is no prohibition of supplemental jurisdiction; indeed, the Court has noted its general ap- Aldinger and Kroger are unprincipled decisions; they neither espouse nor implicitly adopt a consistent method for approaching supplemental jurisdiction issues. The federal courts had worked out such a system in the century before Aldinger and Kroger, although they failed to indicate expressly the statutory basis for their exercise of jurisdiction. But a plausible statutory basis exists, and is supported both by the traditional canons of statutory construction and by the longstanding congressional acquiescence regarding the judicial definition of the scope of a civil action.
213
Aldinger paid lip service to a presumption consistent with this history and with the principled approach set forth above. But in applying the presumption, the Court sanctioned unjustified judicial scavenger hunts into legislative history and blurred the independent lines of authority relating, respectively, to invoking original jurisdiction and to packaging a civil action. In Kroger the blurring became blindness to the separateness of the lines, with the Court importing into supplemental jurisdiction doctrine the restrictive rules relating to the invocation of original jurisdiction. The cases direct federal judges to divine a legislative intent that does not exist. Until Congress addresses the point meaningfully, the quest for legislative intent is ludicrous.
The availability of supplemental jurisdiction obviously has an impact on the desirability of invoking federal jurisdiction in the first place. 214 Both Aldinger and Kroger foster inefficiency. For example, the practical result in Kroger is that the underlying suit and the defendant's impleader claim against the third-party defendant may be litigated in federal court, while the plaintiff's claim against the same third-party defendant, transactionally related to the other claims, must be pursued in state court. Two lawsuits are required for what is, transactionally defined, one dispute. The plaintiff may avoid this expense and duplication only by abandoning the federal forum and pursuing both claims in state court. 2 1985) ) (plaintiff who is unable to achieve packaging in federal court will be tempted to abandon federal forum altogether).
215. Note that this plaintiff has done nothing "wrong," unlike the plaintiff who attempts co]lusive joinder. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1987". 34 And because the Kroger rule, like that in Aldinger, is a per se prohibition of supplemental jurisdiction, it leaves the trial courts no discretion to exercise jurisdiction. 2 1 6 Thus even in a case where the plaintiff did not actually foresee joinder of the third-party defendant, and in which a trial judge might determine that the interest in packaging outweighed any federalism problem, joinder cannot be effected.
Aldinger and Kroger may be explained as efforts to keep state law claims out of federal court. Aldinger approves of pendent party jurisdiction only where complete joinder cannot be effected in state court. 2 17 In all cases in which packaging can be realized in state court-even those involving federal question claims-the plaintiff is offered a strong incentive to go there. Thus the plaintiff who chooses to package his action efficiently by bringing all related claims in one court must eschew the federal forum on the federal question claim.
Kroger is a naked antidiversity case. The deliberate refusal to consider it for what it was-a supplemental jurisdiction case-enabled the Court to expand the application of Strawbridge to order the per se dismissal of claims satisfying Gibbs. In federal question cases, pendent jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to assert nonfederal claims as an original matter. 218 In diversity cases, however, a plaintiff now caimot append a subsequent, procedurally proper Rule 14(a) claim against a third-party defendant as to whom the court already has subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
There are policy arguments supporting a harsher treatment of supplemental jurisdiction in the diversity context. 2 19 The Court, however, did not appeal to policy in Aldinger and Kroger. Instead, it based its holdings on congressional intent. Although the issue may be debatable, the Court would be hard put to find meaningful congressional indications that diversity jurisdiction was meant to be treated as the stepchild of 216. See Berch, supra note 181, at 253 ("[The Court in Owen] creates an enclave of issues which federal courts may be impotent to adjudicate.").
217. See Redish, supra note 214, at 1395 ("Aldinger] was viewed as a means of reducing federal dockets.").
218. It is fascinating that Gibbs, which upheld pendent jurisdiction where federal question jurisdiction was invoked, suffered all of the defects found important by the Court in Kroger. Specifically, the joined claim was not logically dependent on the federal claim, the plaintiff achieved by indirection what he could not have done directly, and supplemental jurisdiction was asserted over a claim by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 185, at 247-48. Moreover, the plaintiff in Gibbs could have achieved efficient packaging of both of his claims in a single action in state court. Matasar, supra note 1, at 165 & n.301.
219. These policy arguments have been asserted in the ongoing debate concerning retention of diversity, and need not be repeated in detail here. They include concerns that federaljudges cannot render precedential opinions as to matters of state law, that diversity constitutes an unseemly intrusion into matters of state law, and that the federal courts' workload has become overwhelming. See supra notes 63-64, 76 and accompanying text.
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DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:34 federal jurisdiction. 20 Thus this confused brace of cases may ultimately be seen in interestgroup terms as the imposition of agency costs by an overworked federal bench that is, in some appreciable measure, hostile to diversity jurisdiction.221 Whether the Court is ultimately successful in imposing these costs depends on how the lower courts apply the cases and, in turn, on whether the relevant interest group-the organized bar-is so inconvenienced as to seek congressional correction of the precedents.
B. The Wages of Confusion: Ten Years After.
Because Aldinger and Kroger provided no meaningful guidance on supplemental jurisdiction issues, it is not surprising that the situation in the lower courts is perhaps more chaotic now than it was before those cases were decided. 2 22 Although some litigants have urged courts to read the cases as an invitation to reassess supplemental jurisdiction in other contexts, 223 the cases give no indication of an emerging consensus.
224
Of course, this is an absurd result. The Court has only spoken twice in a century on the issue of legislative authorization of supplemental jurisdiction. Instead of broad, meaningftl pronouncements, the Court has provided unprincipled, result-oriented cases that have given the lower courts no guidance and have, in retrospect, resolved very little beyond their peculiar facts. The lower courts' reaction clearly bespeaks confusion; it may also indicate a much greater appreciation for packaging than the Supreme Court seems to have.
VI. CONCLUSION
Only two conclusions can be drawn with any certainty. First, the Supreme Court's dalliance with congressional sanction for supplemental jurisdiction has not provided meaningful guidance. Second, it has not created such a restriction on access to federal court as to pressure Congress to take remedial action. This latter point does not change the fact, however, that the federal courts need a principled, consistent manner in which to approach the statutory authorization of supplemental jurisdiction. I hope that this article has provided one.
